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INTRODUCTION
Lower federal courts continue to issue universal (or nonparticularized) injunctions 1—injunctions prohibiting government
† Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, FIU College
of Law. Thanks to Thomas Baker, Josh Blackman, Samuel Bray, Maureen Carroll, Josh Chafetz,
Zachary Clopton, James Pfander, Michael Solimine, Maxwell Stearns, and Alan Trammell for
comments and suggestions. Thanks to participants in the Constitutional Law Works-in-Progress
program at the 2020 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting.
1 E.g., HIAS, Inc. v. Trump, 985 F.3d 309, 326–27 (4th Cir. 2021); New York v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. dismissed, 141 S. Ct. 1292 (2021); City
of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 911–931 (7th Cir. 2020); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump,
950 F.3d 1242, 1260 (9th Cir. 2020), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g en banc, 993
F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2021); Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F.3d 451, 457–58 (8th Cir. 2019); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 511–12 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d in part,
vacated in part, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d
by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Wynn v. Vilsack, No. 21-cv-514-MMH-JRK,
2021 WL 2580678, at *17 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2021); Louisiana v. Biden, No. 21-CV-00778, 2021
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defendants from enforcing challenged laws against all rights-holders who
might be enforcement targets, whether parties or non-parties to the
litigation. Many scholars support these efforts 2 in the face of scholarly3
and judicial4 criticism.

WL 2446010 (W.D. La. June 15, 2021); Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs., No. 20-cv-3377, 2021 WL 1779282, at *9 (D.D.C. May 5, 2021), stay granted
pending appeal, 2021 WL 1946376 (D.D.C. May 14, 2021); Texas v. United States, No. 21-cv00003, 2021 WL 247877, at *6–7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2021); Danville Christian Acad. v. Beshear,
503 F. Supp. 3d 516, 531 (E.D. Ky.), stay granted on other grounds, 981 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2020),
denying motion to vacate stay, 141 S. Ct. 527 (2020); Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791,
830–35 (E.D. Pa. 2019), rev’d sub nom. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020); Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 437–38
(E.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp.
3d 497, 539–40 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
2 E.g., Rachel Bayefsky, Remedies and Respect: Rethinking the Role of Federal Judicial
Relief, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming); Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118
MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (2019); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1065, 1069 (2018); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56 (2017); Bradford Mank & Michael E. Solimine, State Standing
and National Injunctions, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1955, 1973 (2019); Portia Pedro, Toward
Establishing a Pre-Extinction Definition of “Nationwide Injunctions,” 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 847
(2020); James E. Pfander & Jacob P. Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex Parte Young, 72
STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1353–54 (2020); Mila Sohoni, The Power to Vacate a Rule, 88 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1121, 1124–27 (2020) [hereinafter Sohoni, Vacate]; Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the
“Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 924 (2020) [hereinafter Sohoni, History]; Alan
M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98 TEX. L. REV. 67, 73–74 (2019).
3 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, M ODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 436 (4th ed. 2010); Samuel L. Bray,
Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 469 (2017);
Ronald A. Cass, Nationwide Injunctions’ Governance Problems: Forum Shopping, Politicizing
Courts, and Eroding Constitutional Structure, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV. 29 (2019); John Harrison,
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act Does Not Call for Universal Injunctions or Other
Universal Remedies, 37 YALE J. REGUL. BULL. 37 (2020); Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating
Nationwide Injunctions, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2019) [hereinafter Morley, Disaggregating];
Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower
Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 620 (2017) [hereinafter Morley, Nationwide]; Jonathan Remy Nash,
State Standing for Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1985, 2012 (2019); Howard M. Wasserman, Precedent, Non-Universal Injunctions, and
Judicial Departmentalism: A Model of Constitutional Adjudication, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1077, 1080–81, 1093–94 (2020) [hereinafter Wasserman, Departmentalism]; Howard M.
Wasserman, Concepts, Not Nomenclature: Universal Injunctions, Declaratory Judgments,
Opinions, and Precedent, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2020) [hereinafter Wasserman,
Concepts]; Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions
and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 353 (2018) [hereinafter
Wasserman, “Nationwide”].
4 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., joined by
Thomas, J., concurring in the grant of stay); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424–25 (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring); City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 936–38 (Manion, J., concurring in the
judgment); Rodgers, 942 F.3d at 460 (Stras, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); E. Bay
Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1028–30 (9th Cir. 2019); California v. Health & Hum.
Servs., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 2019), vacated by 977 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2020).
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I have argued in multiple articles that federal courts lack the power
or the need to issue universal/non-particularized injunctions and never
should do so.5 But controlling precedent in many circuits accepts them,
at least in identified circumstances. 6 The Supreme Court has avoided the
issue,7 apart from scattered views of individual Justices.8 The Court’s
October Term 2020 calendar included several cases in which lower courts
had issued broad injunctions against Trump Administration policies, 9 but
the new Biden Administration rescinded the challenged policies, mooting
the appeals.10
Halting the judicial practice of issuing universal/non-particularized
injunctions thus requires congressional action. As a default, courts
control their equitable powers to grant injunctive relief. 11 But Congress
may limit or alter the equitable power, so long as it provides a clear
statement of its intent to change or alter courts’ remedial authority.12
The political valence of universal injunctions has shifted—from
conservative plaintiffs seeking to universally enjoin enforcement of
Obama Administration policies 13 to liberal plaintiffs seeking to
universally enjoin enforcement of Trump Administration policies14 back
5 Wasserman, Departmentalism, supra note 3, at 1080–81, 1093–94; Wasserman, Concepts,
supra note 3, at 1000; Wasserman, “Nationwide,” supra note 3, at 353; see sources cited supra
note 3.
6 See, e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 993 F.3d 640, 680–81 (9th Cir. 2021); HIAS,
985 F.3d at 309, 326–27; City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 911–931; Texas, 2021 WL 247877, at *6–
7.
7 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1916 n.7 (2020).
8 Compare New York, 140 S. Ct. at 600 (2020) (Gorsuch J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring
in grant of stay), and Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2425 n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring), with Little
Sisters of the Poor Saint Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2412 n.28 (2020)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting), and Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2446 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
9 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2020); Innovation L. Lab v. Wolf,
951 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot by Mayorkas
v. Innovation L. Lab, No. 19-1212, 2021 WL 2520313 (U.S. June 21, 2021) (mem.).
10 Biden v. Sierra Club, No. 20-138, 2021 WL 2742775 (U.S. July 2, 2021) (mem.), vacating
and remanding Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2020); Mayorkas, 2021 WL 2520313;
Amy Howe, Biden administration asks justices to take immigration cases off February calendar,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/biden-administration-asksjustices-to-take-immigration-cases-off-february-calendar [https://perma.cc/4LFH-ESED].
11 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327–28 (2015).
12 Id. at 327–28; Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982); Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory
Interpretation, 137 U. P A. L. REV. 1007, 1023 (1989).
13 See, e.g., Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 275 F. Supp. 3d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (Department
of Labor overtime regulations); Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 218 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Tex.
2016) (same); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by evenly divided Court,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
14 See, e.g., HIAS, Inc. v. Trump, 985 F.3d 309, 326–27 (4th Cir. 2021); New York v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. dismissed, 141 S. Ct. 1292
(2021); City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 911–931 (7th Cir. 2020); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant
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to conservative plaintiffs seeking to universally enjoin enforcement of
Biden Administration policies. 15 Republican-controlled congressional
committees convened two hearings to criticize the practice during the
Trump Administration,16 but conservative activists discovered their
benefits with the coming of the Biden presidency.17 Democrats appeared
more receptive to universal injunctions when the injunctions targeted
objectionable Republican policies and less inclined to strip courts of all
power to issue them. 18
Members of Congress and commentators have offered numerous
concrete legislative approaches to stopping or limiting universal/nonparticularized injunctions. One proposed approach is appropriate, a valid
exercise of legislative power, and an actual solution to the actual
problem—a flat and unequivocal prohibition on injunctions protecting or
binding anyone other than parties to litigation.19 Other proposals fail by
misunderstanding or ignoring the real problems, repeating the mistakes
that have plagued courts and scholars in this debate.20 Because of that
misunderstanding, these proffered approaches fail—as a matter of
substance and as a matter of nomenclature—to resolve the scope-ofremedy debate.
Three preliminary points set up the discussion that follows. First, if
Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement prohibits universal/nonparticularized injunctions,21 these legislative efforts are superfluous,

v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1260 (9th Cir. 2020), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g en
banc, 993 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2021).
15 See, e.g., Wynn v. Vilsack, No. 21-cv-514-MMH-JRK, 2021 WL 2580678, at *17 (M.D.
Fla. June 23, 2021); Louisiana v. Biden, No. 21-CV-00778, 2021 WL 2446010, at *22 (W.D. La.
June 15, 2021); Alabama Ass’n of Realtors v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-cv3377, 2021 WL 1779282, at *9 (D.D.C. May 5, 2021), stay granted pending appeal, 2021 WL
1946376 (D.D.C. May 14, 2021); Texas v. United States, No. 21-cv-00003, 2021 WL 247877, at
*6–7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2021).
16 Rule by District Judge: The Challenges of Universal Injunctions: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020); The Role and Impact of Nationwide Injunctions by
District Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017).
17 See generally Scott A. Keller, Nationwide Injunctions Will Be a Vital Check if Biden
Overreaches, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nationwide-injunctionswill-be-a-vital-check-if-biden-overreaches-11606081224 [https://perma.cc/J837-NQJJ].
18 Rule by District Judge: The Challenges of Universal Injunctions: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020) (opening statement of Sen. Feinstein, Ranking
Member); The Role and Impact of Nationwide Injunctions by District Courts: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong.
(2017) (statement of Rep. Nadler, Ranking Member).
19 H.R. 77, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. (2018); infra Part I.
20 Infra Parts II–V.
21 Bray, supra note 3, at 421, 471; Cass, supra note 3, at 58–59; Harrison, supra note 3; Morley,
Disaggregating, supra note 3, at 14; Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and
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announcing that courts cannot do something they are not constitutionally
empowered to do. A legislative pronouncement that courts lack this
power perhaps offers an expressive benefit 22 but no practical
consequence. If the limitation on universal/non-particularized injunctions
derives from sub-constitutional equitable and remedial principles subject
to congressional adjustment, 23 these laws serve an important clarifying
and limiting purpose.
Second, an injunction must accord “complete relief” to the plaintiff
and should be commensurate with and match the constitutional violation,
while being no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary. It must
ensure that the plaintiff is not subject to or threatened with present or
future enforcement of the constitutionally invalid law.24
The third issue concerns nomenclature—what to call the injunctions
that Congress is attempting to regulate or eliminate. The scope of an
injunction entails two features—its “who” (what persons are bound or
protected by the injunction) and its “where” (the geographic locales in
which they enjoy that protection). 25 The prevailing term “nationwide
injunction”26 describes the “where” of geography, rather than the “who”
of protected parties. In fact, to accord the plaintiff the required complete
relief, all injunctions should be nationwide—they should protect the
plaintiff throughout the nation by prohibiting enforcement of the
challenged law against her anywhere in the nation she might go.
The scholarly, judicial, and legislative debate is over injunctions
with an overbroad “who.” “Universal injunction” better describes an
order protecting the universe of potential targets of enforcement of the
challenged law, whether parties to the litigation or not. 27 A related term
is “non-particularized,” which captures injunctions protecting beyond the
parties—injunctions not “particularized” to the parties—whether

Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases,
39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. P OL’Y 487, 516 (2016) [hereinafter Morley, De Facto Class Actions?].
22 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. P A. L. REV. 2021, 2022
(1996).
23 Wasserman, Departmentalism, supra note 3, at 1094; Wasserman, “Nationwide,” supra note
3, at 354–55.
24 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979);
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293–94 (1976); Wasserman, Departmentalism, supra note 3, at
1094.
25 Wasserman, “Nationwide,” supra note 3, at 349.
26 Texas v. United States, No. 21-cv-00003, 2021 WL 247877, at *6 n.5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 26,
2021).
27 Wasserman, Concepts, supra note 3, at 1006; Wasserman, “Nationwide,” supra note 3, at
350; see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch J., joined
by Thomas, J., concurring in the grant of stay); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 n.1 (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring); City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 913–14 n.7 (7th Cir. 2020).
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covering the universe of enforcement targets or a set of targets smaller
than the universe but larger than the plaintiff.28
With those points, this essay explores five legislative proposals for
eliminating or limiting universal/non-particularized injunctions—one of
which resolves the problem and four of which fail for various reasons.
This analysis can inform Congress about the true problem and can guide
future legislative efforts. With the political valence of the debate and of
arguments for and against these injunctions having flipped with the 2021
change in presidential administrations and congressional control,29 the
time for legislative action has arrived.
I.

INJUNCTIONS LIMITED TO PARTIES

Two House bills from 2018 and 2019, titled the Injunctive Authority
Clarification Act,30 present the single appropriate way to halt overbroad
injunctions. Both prohibit any federal court from issuing any order “that
purports to restrain the enforcement against a non-party of any statute,
regulation, order, or similar authority.”31 Both include an exception
where the “non-party is represented by a party acting in a representative
capacity pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”32
These bills identify and address the real problem of universal/nonparticularized injunctions—that they purport to prohibit government
officials from enforcing laws not only against the parties to the action,
but against non-parties who should not otherwise be protected by the
court’s order. And they offer the appropriate solution—a flat prohibition
on universal/non-particularized injunctions and on courts attempting to
protect strangers to the litigation or to limit future government
enforcement against those strangers to the litigation. These bills establish
by statute the state of affairs that judicial and scholarly critics of universal
injunctions have urged—injunctions protecting the plaintiffs against
future enforcement of the challenged law, but protecting no one else.33
The exception for class actions preserves the essential role of civil
rights injunctive class actions under Rule 23(b)(2).34 A class-wide
injunction remains particularized and non-universal—it protects and

28

Wasserman, Concepts, supra note 3, at 1007.
See supra notes 14–16.
30 H.R. 77, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. (2018).
31 H.R. 77, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. (2018).
32 H.R. 77, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. (2018).
33 See supra notes 3–4.
34 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); see Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 857–
58 (2016); David Marcus, Flawed But Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 680–81 (2011).
29
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benefits only the plaintiff. But the plaintiff is the class of rights-holders,
the class having assumed an identity and legal status independent of the
representative individual plaintiff. 35 Rule 23 expands the scope of the
injunction by expanding who is a party before the court and therefore who
is and may be protected by an appropriate non-universal/particularized
injunction.36
II.

INJUNCTIONS LIMITED TO PARTIES AND DISTRICT

Three bills, two bearing the not-subtle title of “Nationwide
Injunction Abuse Prevention Act,” offer a second solution.37 They
employ identical language to prohibit district courts from issuing any
order for injunctive relief except when limited to the parties to the action
or to the federal judicial district in which the order was issued. 38
This approach gets it half-right but half-wrong. Like the appropriate
approach described in Part I, these bills recognize that the injunction’s
“who” must protect the parties to the action, but should not extend to
strangers to the litigation.
But they fail by conflating the injunction’s “who” with its
“where”—conflating universality in who is protected with nationwide as
to where they are protected. A geographically cramped injunction means
a plaintiff who convinces the court that enforcement of the challenged
law against her violates her rights remains subject to enforcement of that
law in a different place. An injunction prohibiting enforcement of a
federal law issued by a district court in California would not protect the
plaintiff from enforcement of the same federal law in Arizona. An
injunction prohibiting enforcement of an Arkansas anti-loitering law
issued by a court in the Eastern District of Arkansas would not protect
the plaintiff from enforcement of that Arkansas law in a part of the state
falling within the Western District of Arkansas. Alternatively, a plaintiff
must file suit and obtain a unique injunction in every federal district
within which she acts and in which she might be subject to enforcement
of the challenged federal or state law.
Either way, these bills strip federal courts of too much remedial
authority. They deprive courts of power to accord geographically
35 United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1538 (2018); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 399 (1975).
36 Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399; Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F.3d 451, 464 (8th Cir. 2019) (Stras, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Morley, De Facto Class Actions?, supra note 21, at 541;
Morley, Disaggregating, supra note 3, at 17–19.
37 H.R. 4927, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. 4292, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 2464, 116th Cong.
(2019).
38 H.R. 4927, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. 4292, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 2464, 116th Cong.
(2019).
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complete relief that is commensurate with and matching of the
constitutional violation, at least where the plaintiff operates in multiple
places and outside “neat geographic boundaries.”39
Litigation over Trump Administration asylum regulations
demonstrates the mischief of the second piece of these proposals and the
potential conflation of their parts. Four advocacy organizations sued to
stop enforcement of regulations stripping asylum eligibility from anyone
who entered the United States other than at a point of entry.40 The
Northern District of California enjoined all enforcement of the
regulations, in and out of the Ninth Circuit; the Ninth Circuit stayed the
injunction’s extra-circuit reach pending appeal, while leaving the
injunction unstayed within the circuit as to all potential enforcement
targets, beyond the four plaintiff entities. 41 The temporary relief was
over- and under-protective. It was over-protective by protecting the nonparticularized universe of every potential enforcement target within the
Ninth Circuit. It was under-protective by failing to protect the named
plaintiffs outside the Ninth Circuit, where they operated and remained
subject to enforcement of the challenged regulations.
The Ninth Circuit corrected the remedial problem when it
considered the injunction on the merits later in the litigation. Affirming a
preliminary injunction protecting the plaintiff organizations (but not nonparties) outside their home states, the court explained that the plaintiffs’
operations were not limited to “neat geographic boundaries,” so an
injunction limited to California or to the Ninth Circuit would not protect
them from losing clients in Texas as a result of the regulation. 42
Unfortunately, these bills compel the problematic initial outcome
and prevent the appropriate later outcome in East Bay. In fact, they
compound the problem by requiring the court to limit the injunction not
to the eleven jurisdictions comprising the Ninth Circuit or to the State of
California, but only to the Northern District of California.
The bills also contain a linguistic glitch that perhaps confuses their
effects. They prohibit injunctions except where the order applies only to
(1) the parties “or” (2) in the federal district that issued the injunction. 43
39 See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2018)), amended and
superseded on denial of reh’g en banc, 993 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2021).
40 E. Bay Sanctuary, 950 F.3d at 1260.
41 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2019). The Supreme
Court stayed the injunction in full pending review. Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct.
3 (2019).
42 E. Bay Sanctuary, 950 F.3d at 1282–83 (quoting E. Bay Sanctuary, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1120).
The Supreme Court granted, then dismissed, certiorari. Wilkinson v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,
141 S. Ct. 1292 (2021) (mem.).
43 H.R. 4927, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. 4292, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 2464, 116th Cong.
(2019).
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“Or” suggests that the clauses are disjunctive—that only one statutory
condition must be satisfied.
Thus, an injunction limited to the parties (satisfying (1)) need not be
limited to the districts (not satisfying (2)). If so, the bills leave us where
we should be—prohibiting universal/non-particularized injunctions that
protect strangers to the litigation but permitting nationwide particularized
injunctions that protect the named plaintiff wherever she is or goes.
But the disjunctive reading permits the converse—an injunction
limited to the federal district (satisfying (2)) need not be limited to the
parties (not satisfying (1)). That is, the proposals permit injunctions that
are overly non-particularized but insufficiently nationwide. That result
gets everything backwards—insufficient relief to the plaintiff, excessive
relief to strangers to the litigation. A universal-but-not-nationwide
injunction provides improper in-district relief to non-parties who should
not be within the injunction’s umbrella, while failing to accord necessary
out-of-district relief to the parties whom the injunction is supposed to
protect.
III.

IMMEDIATE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

A third approach leaves untouched whatever power federal courts
might possess to issue what the bill calls nationwide injunctions but
provides that “appeal from the order granting such injunction shall lie to
the Supreme Court.”44 The word “appeal” indicates that review is
mandatory, rather than discretionary. 45 Although it uses the term
nationwide injunction, the statutory definition matches what I label a
universal/non-particularized injunction that protects non-parties.
This proposal leaves district judges free to issue broad injunctions
but limits their time in existence through mandatory and speedy reversal
or affirmance by the Court of last resort. It also addresses the criticism
that plaintiffs forum shop in seeking universal relief,46 by running to a
presumptively favorable court (conservative plaintiffs to the Fifth Circuit,
liberal plaintiffs to the Ninth Circuit). Immediate and mandatory Supreme
Court review neutralizes any geographic or ideological gamesmanship in
the plaintiff’s initial choice of forum.

44

H.R. 4219, 116th Cong. (2019).
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But the proposal ignores the foundational point that no federal court
should issue universal/non-particularized injunctions.47 The problem is
not district courts issuing overbroad relief; the problem is any federal
court at any point in the judicial hierarchy issuing relief that expands and
exceeds its remedial powers. The Supreme Court possesses no more
power to affirm a universal/non-particularized injunction than the district
court possesses to issue that universal/non-particularized injunction.
Quick and mandatory review produces a speedier Article III final
judgment from the Supreme Court, but that Article III final judgment
must remain particularized to the parties.
This bill fails to address the true universality/non-particularity
problem in three further respects. First, it conflates judgments that resolve
a specific legal action between adverse parties and opinions that explain
the reasons for the judgment.48 Direct and mandatory review speeds the
issuance of a Supreme Court opinion, establishing binding precedent and
binding resolution of constitutional questions regardless of the scope of
the judgment the district court issues or the Supreme Court affirms. But
the creation of Supreme Court precedent through the opinion obviates the
need for universality/non-particularity in the judgment. If the Supreme
Court must take the case and must resolve the constitutional question,
every case will “finally” resolve the issue for all rights-holders, party and
non-party, through binding judicial precedent. If binding precedent
affecting future enforcement by all government officials as to all rightsholders emerges from every case, there is no need to make the judgment
and injunction universal, even for a limited period.
Second, limiting speedier and mandatory Supreme Court review to
cases of universal injunctions creates unintended perverse incentives.
Plaintiffs (especially ideologically motivated parties and counsel) will
seek, and district courts will grant, more universal/non-particularized
injunctions, recognizing that it guarantees Supreme Court review and
resolution. Given a choice between ordinary three-step particularized
litigation and a certain, immediate answer through universal litigation,
litigants and lower courts will choose the latter. Litigants want final
resolution of the question; lower courts want to flex the power of issuing
one all-controlling order, if for a limited period.
Finally, this proposal may not achieve what advocates hope. The bill
presumes a particular partisan posture—a conservative administration
enacting conservative policies challenged by liberal plaintiffs,
universally enjoined by liberal lower-court judges appointed by past
presidents. The solution is a conservative Supreme Court reviewing and
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(presumably) reversing those judgments, smacking down over-reaching
lower-court judges, and enabling enforcement of the conservative
policies. And that is, in the barest sense, the 2019 milieu in which the
bill’s Republican sponsors operated. Notwithstanding President Trump’s
success in filling the federal courts,49 however, that milieu is not
permanent. At some point, a Democratic administration and Democraticcontrolled Congress will create and enforce liberal policies that
conservative plaintiffs may wish to universally enjoin; they may not want
mandatory review by an ideologically different Supreme Court.
IV.

THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS WITH IMMEDIATE REVIEW

Fifth Circuit Judge Gregg Costa imports the entire three-judge
district court system—three-judge courts50 with mandatory direct
Supreme Court review 51—for all requests for universal/nonparticularized injunctions. 52 He adds a further wrinkle—any action
seeking a universal/non-particularized injunction would be randomly
assigned to a regional circuit whose chief judge would select the panel
from circuit and district judges within the circuit.53 Although never
reduced to legislation, codifying Costa’s proposal would be easy, as the
current three-judge statute anticipates applying that process whenever
required by a new act of Congress.54
Costa’s proposal employs the logic that motivated Congress to
create three-judge district courts for challenges to state legislation in 1910
and to extend them to challenges to federal legislation in 1937. 55 One
district judge should not prevent a state or the United States from
enforcing its laws, and a panel of judges is more likely to arrive at the
correct constitutional answer than a single trial judge.56 A universal/nonparticularized decision from that single district judge—preventing all
enforcement of the challenged law by all government officials against all
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Howard M. Wasserman, Academic Feeder Judges, 105 JUDICATURE 60, 71 (2021).
28 U.S.C. § 2284.
51 28 U.S.C. § 1253.
52 Costa, supra note 46; Mank & Solimine, supra note 2, at 1980–81.
53 Costa, supra note 46. Under the current system, a request for a three-judge court is referred
to the chief judge of the circuit embracing the district in which an action is filed. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2284(b)(1).
54 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).
55 See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed 1976); 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (repealed 1976); Costa, supra note
46; Mank & Solimine, supra note 2, at 1980; Michael T. Morley, Vertical Stare Decisis and ThreeJudge District Courts, 108 GEO. L.J. 699, 728–31, 734–36 (2020); Michael E. Solimine, Congress,
Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 116–18
(2006).
56 Costa, supra note 46.
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rights-holders and all potential enforcement targets in all places—
magnifies those concerns.
Like the proposal for immediate Supreme Court review discussed in
Part III,57 Costa’s proposal emphasizes and resolves the forum-shopping
problem.58 Plaintiffs cannot forum-shop to an ideologically sympathetic
single-division district seeking universal relief from the lone active
judge.59 Plaintiffs cannot shop for a presumptively favorable circuit
because the place of filing does not dictate the place of adjudication.
Randomizing the circuit, the appointing chief judge, and the roster of
judges from which the three-judge panel can be drawn eliminates any
influence the plaintiff might exercise in choosing any judge on the panel.
But Costa’s proposal fails for the same reason that immediate review
fails: no federal court can protect non-party strangers to litigation or
enjoin defendants as to non-party strangers to the litigation, regardless of
number of judges, composition, location, or position in the judicial
hierarchy. A three-judge district court’s injunctive power is no broader
than a single-judge district court’s injunctive power. The Supreme Court
possesses no greater power to affirm universal/non-particularized
injunctions from a three-judge district court than from a single-judge
district court.60
Costa’s approach also produces the same perverse incentives to
pursue a universal remedy in all cases. Every plaintiff will request a
universal/non-particularized injunction, guaranteeing a three-judge panel
(which, as during the Civil Rights Era, might benefit plaintiffs61) and
speedy and mandatory Supreme Court review. Three-judge district courts
will return to being routine in constitutional litigation, requiring more
three-judge panels each year and increasing the burdens on lower-court
judges and Supreme Court dockets. This recreates the docket burdens that
compelled the Justices to resist62 prior three-judge statutes and Congress
to eliminate routine three-judge courts in 1976.63
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V. MANDATORY LITIGATION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
A final option—discussed but never drafted—places all actions
seeking universal/non-particularized injunctions in the District of the
District of Columbia, with review to the D.C. Circuit. 64 The United States
is “in” D.C., the logic goes, so cases seeking this extraordinary relief
should go exclusively to the United States’ home district. 65 Like Costa’s
three-judge proposal and the immediate-review proposal,66 this addresses
the forum-shopping criticism by funneling remedially identical cases to
one district and one regional circuit. It strips plaintiffs of the opportunity
and temptation to shop for a favorable district with a favorable judge
within a favorable circuit.
It also should be obvious that identical objections apply to this
proposal as to the prior proposals. Federal judges in the District of
Columbia have no greater power to issue or affirm universal/nonparticularized injunctions than federal judges in any district anywhere in
the United States.
This proposal introduces three new problems. First, Bradford Mank
and Michael Solimine argue that it injects a dose of partisanship. Routing
cases to the District of Columbia may increase the partisan tensions of
constitutional litigation, given the political nature of cases in which states
challenge the validity of federal law 67 and the increasing polarization over
appointments to the D.C. Circuit as incubator for Supreme Court
Justices.68 Depending on the political valence of a case,69 D.C.-based
judges become more likely to issue universal/non-particularized
injunctions, the opposite of the plan’s intent.
Second, this proposal presumes that universal/non-particularized
injunctions arise only in challenges to federal law. But injunctions barring
enforcement of a state law are non-particularized/universal if they protect
beyond the plaintiff and prohibit enforcement of that state law against all
potential enforcement targets, including non-parties.70 The “universe” of
enforcement targets is smaller as to state law, but the problem of a non-

64 Mank & Solimine, supra note 2, at 1978–80; The Role and Impact of Nationwide Injunctions
by District Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., and the Internet, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Hans von Spakovsky, Heritage Found.).
65 Mank & Solimine, supra note 2, at 1978–80; The Role and Impact of Nationwide Injunctions
by District Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., and the Internet, H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Hans von Spakovsky, Heritage Found.).
66 Costa, supra note 46; supra Parts III–IV.
67 Mank & Solimine, supra note 2, at 1975–76.
68 Id. at 1979.
69 Id. at 1975–76.
70 Supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text.
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particularized order protecting strangers to the litigation remains. 71
Courts and judges have discussed the problem of universality in actions
challenging the validity of state laws.72
That the federal government is “home” in D.C. is irrelevant to
challenges to the constitutional validity of state laws. States are not
“home” in D.C., and federal judges in D.C. have no experience or
expertise with the laws of those states. Congress might limit the proposal
to universal injunctions against enforcement of federal law, while leaving
challenges to enforcement of state laws, even where a universal/nonparticularized injunction is sought, to ordinary forum-selection rules. But
familiarity with the specifics of a state and its laws may be important in
resolving challenges to federal law, especially where a state brings the
action.73 This proposal forces D.C. judges to understand state law and the
unique circumstances of many states that underlie and affect the
constitutional analysis.74 Federal judges in D.C. possess no such
expertise.
Finally, the proposal does not address what happens if the D.C. court
decides that universal/non-particularized relief is inappropriate, but some
non-universal/particularized relief is appropriate. That is, the court
decides that the challenged law is constitutionally invalid and an
injunction prohibiting its enforcement should issue, but the injunction
should be particularized to the plaintiffs. The rationale for placing the
case in a D.C. court has evaporated, so there is no reason for that court to
hear and decide the case. Having recognized that a universal injunction
is inappropriate, the D.C. court must dismiss or transfer the action to a
federal court for the state where the plaintiffs originate, a wasteful
process. And a case may have multiple plaintiffs hailing from multiple
states, leaving no obvious transferee district.
Alternatively, the D.C. court might issue the universal/nonparticularized injunction, even where unnecessary, to justify exercising
jurisdiction. As with the three-judge and immediate-review proposals, a
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plan to limit universal/non-particularized injunctions perversely
incentivizes plaintiffs to seek and courts to issue more of them.
CONCLUSION
Any legislative response to the scope-of-remedy dispute must
address the real problem—court orders protecting non-party strangers to
the litigation. Legislators must not be distracted by side issues and
misnomers, which lead to different legislation that addresses different
problems, that fails to resolve the real problem, and that perhaps worsens
the remedial situation.
Congress could, and should, resolve the judicial and scholarly
debate through simple legislation imposing a flat and unequivocal
prohibition on universal/non-particularized injunctions that protect
anyone other than the plaintiffs, wherever those plaintiffs go in the nation.
That approach—the simplest one—represents the only solution.

